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Companies seeking to attract or retain key employees often
implement "phantom" stock plans. These plans confer on selected
employees the financial benefits of stock ownership without
granting them an equity interest in the company or requiring
them to make a corresponding capital investment.' Under phan-
tom stock plans, companies credit selected employees with a
specified number of "shares" of company stock, and then contrac-
tually promise the employees that they will receive the value of
those shares at a future date.2 Consequently, employees with
phantom stock accumulate wealth through the continuing success
of the company, and employers are able to encourage employees
to remain with the firm.
The increased use of phantom stock plans has given rise to
questions concerning the nature of the relationship between the
company managers who implement the plans and the employees
who receive the phantom stock. In general, corporate directors
must behave appropriately toward the persons to whom they owe
fiduciary duties.4 But as Justice Frankfurter said, "to say that a
man is a fiduciary only begins analysis; it gives direction to fur-
t BA. 1993, Brigham Young University; J.D. Candidate 1996, The University of
Chicago.
1 See Mark A. Teitelbaum, Insurance-Funded Incentive Compensation: Phantom
Stock and Stock Appreciation Rights, J Am Society CLU & ChFC 44, 46 (July 1994); Rob-
ert Charles Clark, Corporate Law § 6.2.1 at 208 (Little, Brown, 1986) (shareholder rights
to vote, inspect, and sue derivatively that derive from the equity relationship are not held
by phantom stockholders). Compare Peter W. Hutchings, The Phantom Stock Plan, J Am
Society CLU 34, 34 (Jan 1986) (noting both that holders of phantom stock do not acquire
ownership interests in the company and that holders of phantom stock receive the bene-
fits of equity in the company). This Comment ultimately takes the position that phantom
stockholders are not equity holders.
2 Hutchings, J Am Society CLU at 34.
3 Id.
" Fiduciary duties are among the highest duties the law can impose. See John C.
Carter, The Fiduciary Rights of Shareholders, 29 Wm & Mary L Rev 823, 824-31 (1988).
See also Meinhard v Salmon, 249 NY 458, 164 NE 545, 546 (1928). Although Meinhard
concerned a partnership, Chief Judge Cardozo wrote that the fiduciary duty of "undivided
loyalty is relentless and supreme ... " and his opinion is often cited to describe the
fiduciary relationship between parties in a corporation. Id at 548.
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ther inquiry. To whom is he a fiduciary? What obligations does
he owe as a fiduciary?"5 Directors do owe fiduciary duties to
common shareholders, the actual owners of the assets that the
directors manage. As fiduciaries, directors must act for the
benefit of the corporation and the shareholders, and subordinate
their personal interests.6 In contrast, corporate directors general-
ly do not owe fiduciary duties to creditors, so long as the corpora-
tion is solvent.7 Where phantom stockholders fit within this
scheme is uncertain. Thus, phantom stock plans present a novel
question under corporate law: Are phantom stockholders like
holders of common stock, or are they merely debt holders? The
answer to this question determines whether corporate officers
and directors owe fiduciary duties to phantom stockholders.
This Comment analyzes the legal characteristics of phantom
stock and argues that, despite the "unprecedented expansion" of
fiduciary law,8 corporate directors should not owe fiduciary
duties to phantom stockholders. Section I describes the common
features of phantom stock plans and explains their advantages
and disadvantages for both employers and employees. It also
discusses the strong parallels between phantom stock and non-
voting common stock, which does carry fiduciary duties. Section
H briefly compares the fiduciary duties directors owe to common
stockholders with the duties they owe to creditors, and outlines
the reasons why some groups are protected by fiduciary duties
while others are not. Finally, Section III concludes that it is
precisely because phantom stock and nonvoting common stock
are so similar that the fiduciary duties of corporate directors
should not extend to phantom stockholders. Rather, employees
and employers should be permitted to bargain freely for fiduciary
duties by electing one or the other of these stockholder options.
Section III thus examines the justifications for allowing parties to
bargain freely, points out problems that would arise if directors
did owe fiduciary duties to phantom stockholders, and rebuts the
argument that phantom stockholders are like minority sharehold-
ers in close corporations, who do receive fiduciary protections.
SEC v Chenery Corp., 318 US 80, 85-86 (1943).
6 Beth A. Buday and Gail A. O'Gradney, 3 Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Private
Corporations § 837.50 at 181-83 (Clark Boardman Callaghan, perm ed 1994).
" See, for example, In re STN Enterprises, 779 F2d 901, 904 (2d Cir 1985). See also
Geyer v Ingersoll Publications Co., 621 A2d 784, 787 (Del Chanc 1992).
' See Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 Cal L Rev 795, 796 (1983).
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I. PHANTOM STOCK
As employers have turned increasingly toward incentive-
based payment programs,9 phantom stock has become more popu-
lar as an alternative form of deferred compensation." Although
large, publicly held corporations use phantom stock plans, the
plans are most common among closely held companies, which
often find it impractical to issue shares of real stock for incentive
plan purposes."
A. Description and Common Features
Phantom stock plans vary; thus, the term "phantom stock"
may be used to describe any form of long-term employee incen-
tive arrangement using units of compensation equivalent to actu-
al shares of the employer's stock.' Nevertheless, all phantom
stockholder agreements have many common features and are
similar in structure to nonvoting stockholder agreements.
1. Plan mechanics.
Under a phantom stock plan, an employer establishes a
phantom stock account for an employee and grants fictional
shares of company "stock" to him. 3 Because actual shares are
not transferred, the stock exists only as a bookkeeping entry and
is therefore appropriately called "phantom" (or "shadow")
stock.'4 Most phantom stock arrangements are structured so
that an employee receives a specified number of vested shares for
each year that he is employed by the corporation. 5 Through the
contract the company promises the employee that he will receive
the value of the vested shares at a specified future date' 6-- usu-
ally retirement, termination of employment, or some other
' See Lee Berton, This Year's Model: Don't like the salary? Just change the formula,
Wall St J R5 (Apr 17, 1991) (reproducing a survey regarding the popular forms of
employee compensation).
,o Teitelbaum, J Am Society CLU & CbFC at 44 (cited in note 1).
Subcommittee on Executive Compensation of the Committee on Employee Benefits
and Executive Compensation of the American Bar Association, Executive Compensation: A
1987 Road Map for the Corporate Advisor, 43 Bus Law 185, 320 (1987).
'2 Id at 319.
" See Hutchings, J Am Society CLU at 34 (cited in note 1). See also Note, Phantom
Stock Plans, 76 Harv L Rev 619, 619-20 (1963).
, Hutchings, J Am Society CLU at 34 (cited in note 1).
' See id.
16 See id.
" At least one court has recognized that the Employee Retirement Income Security
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agreed-upon date. 8
Many phantom stock plans attempt to replicate the actual
ownership rights of common stockholders by basing the value of
the deferred compensation on the underlying value of the
company's common stock, and by paying the same dividends to
phantom stockholders as are paid to regular common stockhold-
ers. The employer either pays these dividends directly to the
employee or credits their equivalent value to the employee's
phantom stock account.'9
Employees entering into phantom stockholder agreements
usually want to know how their account will be valued. This
information enables employees who consider leaving the company
for other employment to assess the worth of their accounts prior
to departing. For this reason, most phantom stock plans provide
a simple method for determining the value of the stock held in an
employee's account.20 In publicly held corporations, the value of
an employee's phantom stock can easily be determined by mul-
tiplying the number of phantom shares in the employee's account
by the market price of the shares on the day the account is set-
tled. In closely held corporations, the most common method of
valuing employee-owned phantom stock is to assess the net
worth or book value of the corporation according to its balance
sheet.2' Once the value of the corporation has been established,
the value of the employee's phantom stock is usually determined
by dividing the book value by the total number of shares out-
standing (including the number of phantom shares), and then
multiplying that number (the value per share) by the number of
phantom shares held by the employee.' When the employee
Act of 1974, 29 USC §§ 301 et seq (1988 & Supp 1993) ("ERISA"), may govern phantom
stock plans. See Spitz v Berlin Industries, Inc., 1994 US Dist LEXIS 1576, *15 (N D Ill)
(holding that phantom stock plan was covered by ERISA). Whether a particular phantom
stock plan falls within the scope of ERISA, however, may be a question of fact to be de-
termined at trial. See, for example, Strzelecki v Schwarz Paper Co., 824 F Supp 821, 827
(N D M 1993). Plans that ERISA covers must have a "named fiduciary" who has ultimate
responsibility for the management and administration of the plan. ERISA § 402(a)(1), 29
USC § 1102(a)(1).
1" Subcommittee on Executive Compensation, 43 Bus Law at 319 (cited in note 11). In
addition, some phantom stock plans allow participants to determine their own settlement
dates, just as stock option participants may determine when to exercise stock options. Id.
19 Teitelbaum, J Am Society CLU & ChFC at 45 (cited in note 1).
Hutchings, J Am Society CLU at 34 (cited in note 1).
21 See id at 35.
See, for example, Will v United Chambers Administrators, Inc., 1987 US Dist
LEXIS 8473, *4 (N D 11) (describing a phantom stockholder agreement under which the
"value of Employee's Stock Units shall be equal to (x) the fair market value of Employer
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finally settles the account, the employer may pay the award ei-
ther as a lump sum or in installments over a period of years.23
Consider a hypothetical phantom stockholder agreement
between HighTech industries and one of its employees,
Hannah.24 HighTech, a relatively new start-up company, is a
closely held, family-run corporation owned by the Harrison fami-
ly. Although Hannah is not an officer or director, she participates
significantly in the operation of the company, and her contribu-
tions are greatly valued by her superiors. Thus, in order to in-
duce Hannah to remain with the company, HighTech offers
Hannah a plan under which she will be credited with one thou-
sand shares of HighTech "stock"--that is, one thousand shares of
phantom stock equal in value to one thousand shares of the fami-
ly-held common stock. Since there are currently three thousand
shares of outstanding common stock held by the Harrisons,
Hannah is essentially an "owner" of 25 percent of HighTech In-
dustries. Based on HighTech's total worth of $400,000, Hannah's
25 percent share is worth $100,000.
Each year for the next ten years-so long as she remains
with HighTech-one hundred shares will become vested in
Hannah's account. After ten years, the one thousand phantom
shares credited to her account will be 100 percent vested. The
value of the shares will be determined by the net worth of the
company at the time Hannah settles her phantom stock account.
For example, if HighTech has a net worth of $1 million when
Hannah settles, the company will owe Hannah $250,000, or $250
per share. If Hannah leaves for other employment, however, she
will be entitled only to the value of the shares that have become
vestedY
as set forth in an appraisal... divided by (y) the number of shares of Employer's Com-
mon Stock issued and outstanding on the Termination Date and then multiplied by (z) the'
number of Stock Units held by Employee on his Termination Date").
Subcommittee on Executive Compensation, 43 Bus Law at 319 (cited in note 11).
U This fictional plan is modeled after the hypothetical phantom stock plan described
in Hutchings, J Am Society CLU at 35-36 (cited in note 1).
The following table graphically depicts the phantom stock plan of HighTech Indus-
tries. The company's worth is assumed to grow steadily at 10 percent per year.
Year No. of Annual Cumulative Worth of Price per Value of Value of
Shares Vested Vested Company at Share at Vested Vested and
Credited Shares Shares 10% Grosth I% Growth Shares Nonvested
Shares
1 1,000 100 100 $400,000 $100 $10,000 $100,000
2 100 200 $440,000 $110 $22,000 $110,000
3 inn qnn I sonn A 121 kqn snn *19n1 nnn
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2. Comparison to nonvoting stock.
Phantom stock is very similar to nonvoting common stock.
Corporations frequently issue nonvoting stock to key employees
pursuant to a stockholder agreement and in connection with the
performance of the employee's services.26 The nonvoting stock-
holder agreement may stipulate many things-as phantom stock-
holder agreements often do-including when the shares will vest,
when the employee may cash out, and if and when dividends will
be paid. As with phantom stock, employers may offer nonvoting
common stock in order to recruit and retain key employees with-
out giving up corporate control.27 Unlike phantom stockholders,
however, holders of nonvoting common stock are clearly owed
fiduciary duties.28
Because phantom stock and nonvoting common stock are so
similar, and because holders of nonvoting stock do receive fidu-
ciary duties, one might argue that fiduciary duties should extend
to holders of phantom stock. In this view, phantom stock is es-
sentially another class of traditional stock; and since phantom
stock and nonvoting stock may serve the same purposes, holders
4 100 400 $532,400 $133 $53,240 $133,100
5 100 500 $585,640 $146 $73,205 $146,410
6 100 600 $644,204 $161 $96,631 $161,051
7 100 700 $708,624 $177 $124,009 $177,156
8 100 800 $779,487 $195 $155,897 $194,872
9 100 900 $857,436 $214 $192,923 $214,359
10 100 1,000 $943,179 $236 $235,795 $235,795
' Nonvoting common stock is not a new phenomenon; its issuance was upheld as
early as 1917. See General Investment Co. v Bethlehem Steel Corp., 87 NJ Eq 234, 100 A
347, 352, (Chanc 1917).
'2 Compare id, where the company issued nonvoting common stock in order to pre-
vent old ownership and control patterns from being disturbed. See also Richard M.
Buxbaum, The Internal Division of Powers in Corporate Governance, 73 Cal L Rev 1671,
1713-19 (1985) (discussing nonvoting common stock and corporate control).
See Zahn v Transamerica Corp., 162 F2d 36, 43-46 (3d Cir 1947) (holding that
directors owe fiduciary duties to all common stockholders, including holders of nonvoting,
preferred stock). See also Harry G. Henn and John R. Alexander, Laws of Corporations
and Other Business Enterprises § 240 at 651-56 (West, 3d ed 1983). Although holders of
nonvoting common stock are owed fiduciary duties, their lack of voting power may still
leave them susceptible to management misbehavior or inefficiency. See Buxbaum, 73 Cal
L Rev at 1715.
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of phantom stock and nonvoting common stock should be treated
similarly.
However, it is precisely because phantom stock and nonvot-
ing common stock are so similar that courts should respect the
decision by employers and employees to enter into either phan-
tom stockholder or nonvoting stockholder agreements. In other
words, employers and employees-not courts-should determine
whether or not a fiduciary relationship exists. Employers seeking
to avoid fiduciary duties can offer phantom stock to key employ-
ees, while employees desiring the protection of fiduciary duties
can bargain for nonvoting common stock. 9
B. The Advantages and Disadvantages of Phantom Stock Plans
Phantom stock plans offer many advantages to both employ-
ers and employees. Employers usually institute the plans because
they want to increase their employees' economic stake in the
business and to enable their employees to share in the company's
growth.0 Phantom stock plans are ideal for closely held corpo-
rations or family businesses (like HighTech Industries) that wish
to compensate key employees without relinquishing either an
equity interest or corporate control."
Phantom stock plans also allow employers to provide incen-
tive-based compensation without requiring a capital investment
on the part of the employee." Additionally, phantom stockholder
agreements that require the credited phantom shares to vest over
' See Section Il.A., discussing the ramifications of allowing parties to bargain freely
for fiduciary duties.
' See, for example, In re Marriage of Leisner, 219 Ill App 3d 752, 579 NE2d 1091,
1092 (1991) (describing a phantom stock plan established "to encourage and reward
[employees] in a manner that will stimulate [their] active interest in the development and
financial success of the Company and strengthen [their] desire to remain with the Compa-
ny"); Pogostin v Rice, Civ Act No 6235, slip op at 2 ([Well Ct Chanc, Aug 12, 1983), aff'd,
480 A2d 619 (Del 1984) (examining a phantom stock plan expressly intended to provide
an incentive to key employees and to enable the corporation to retain and attract high
quality personnel). See also Teitelbaum, J Am Society CLU & ChFC at 46 (cited in note
1).
1 See Teitelbaum, J Am Society CLU & ChFC at 46 (cited in note 1). Publicly held
companies, which are generally unconcerned with relinquishing ownership, may also use
phantom stock plans because they do not want to dilute existing shareholders' equity
through the issuance of new shares of stock to employees. Subcommittee on Executive
Compensation, 43 Bus Law at 320 (cited in note 11).
' See Clark, Corporate Law § 6.2.1 at 208-09 (cited in note 1) (phantom stock plans
avoid the need for financing by individual employees); Hutchings, J Am Society CLU at 35
(cited in note 1) ('Te employee obtains the primary benefit of ownership without.., out-
of-pocket cost."). See also Teitelbaum, J Am Society CLU & ChFC at 46 (cited in note 1).
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time (like the HighTech Industries plan) provide a stronger eco-
nomic tie to the company than stock options or grants of common
stock in the business.3 Because an employee realizes the full
value of the phantom stock arrangement only by remaining with
the company, and because phantom stock is generally illiquid,'
the plan serves as a sort of "golden handcuffs," helping the em-
ployer retain key employees. 5 Furthermore, in order to prevent
employees from going to work for competitors, many phantom
stock plans include "no competition" provisions that require em-
ployees to forfeit their phantom stock if the provision is
breached. 6
Phantom stock plans are also flexible and simple. They are
flexible because an employer can discriminate in choosing which
of its employees will participate in the plan. Thus, phantom stock
is usually issued to a key employee whom an employer specifical-
ly wants to compensate and keep.37 Phantom stock plans are
simple because establishing the plan typically requires only a
resolution of the directors and the execution of an agreement
with the employee. 8 In addition, phantom stock plans are ap-
pealing because companies are not required to make any cash
' See Teitelbaum, J Am Society CLU & ChFC at 46 (cited in note 1). For example, if
Hannah wishes to realize the full value of the one thousand shares of phantom stock
granted to her, she must remain at HighTech for ten years-until all one thousand shares
vest. In contrast, an employee given actual shares of stock or stock options can sell them
for full value immediately upon receipt.
' See id (phantom stock provides a stronger economic tie to the company than out-
right sales or grants of interest in the business which can be resold by the employee). See,
for example, Smoyer v Taxation Division Director, 4 NJ Tax 42, 50 (1982), aff'd, 95 NJ
139, 469 A2d 920 (1983) (holding that because phantom stock units are "not assignable,
discountable or marketable," they are not subject to New Jersey state income tax until
they vest). In this way, phantom stock is like the stock of close corporations, for which
there also is generally no market.
' See, for example, Dower v Mosser Industries, Inc., 648 F2d 183, 186-87 (3d Cir
1981) (noting that key employees were given phantom stock because retaining them was
"vital to the future of the company"). See also Hutchings, J Am Society CLU at 34 (cited
in note 1) ("The term 'golden handcuffs,' thus, is applied to any plan which generates
sufficient appeal to retain" key employees.).
"No competition" provisions are most commonly found in phantom stock agree-
ments where the settled "stock" is paid out in installments. See, for example, Healy v Rich
Products Corp., 981 F2d 68, 70 (2d Cir 1992). Some plans prescribe that employees who
leave the company must forfeit their phantom stock. See Foltz v U.S. News & World
Report, Inc., 663 F Supp 1494, 1508 (D DC 1987), aff'd, 865 F2d 364 (DC Cir 1989) ("The
phantom stock shares ... were subject to forfeiture if the awardee left the Company
before normal retirement."). See also Hutchings, J Am Society CLU at 37 (cited in note 1).
Teitelbaum, J Am Society CLU & ChFC at 45 (cited in note 1).
" Id at 46.
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outlay until an employee settles his account-a particular benefit
for start-up companies.
Phantom stock plans do have disadvantages, however. First,
all phantom stock arrangements are premised on the notion that
an employee's phantom shares will become more valuable as the
business becomes more successful. The underlying assumption is
that the employee's individual efforts will increase the value of
the company.39 Yet gearing the economic reward to the overall
performance of the company-as opposed to the employee's indi-
vidual performance or the performance of the employee's divi-
sion-may have detrimental effects. If an employee is performing
well but the company is not correspondingly increasing in value,
the employee may become frustrated and cease to work as hard.
On the other hand, an employee may perform poorly relative to
the strength of the business, resulting in overcompensation for
the employee." This difficulty might be mitigated, however, by
tying the value of the employee's phantom shares to the business
performance of the employee's particular division.
Additionally, determining the value of an employee's phan-
tom account may be burdensome for closely held companies,
whose shares are not traded daily on an exchange and whose val-
ue per share of phantom stock is thus not readily ascertain-
able.4 Furthermore, because employees are not required to in-
vest their own capital, it is possible that they will have less in-
centive to remain with the company if it does not perform well."
Employers, in contrast, might have to pay more than anticipated
to employees if a particular plan exceeds expectations.' Finally,
employees may feel that illiquid phantom stock arrangements
with fixed settlement dates are less advantageous than tradition-
al stock options, which can be exercised at any time." Many
Hutchings, J Am Society CLU at 34 (cited in note 1).
Teitelbaum, J Am Society CLU & ChFC at 46 (cited in note 1). In Berkwitz v
Humphrey, 163 F Supp 78 (N D Ohio 1958), a federal district court held a phantom stock
plan invalid because of the lack of relationship between the value of the services rendered
by the employee and the market value of the stock by which his award was measured.
Subsequent cases have not followed this view. See, for example, Lieberman v Becker, 155
A2d 596, 601 (Del 1959) (expressly refusing to accept the reasoning of Berkwitz).
" Teitelbaum, J Am Society CLU & ChFC at 46 (cited in note 1). The value of phan-
tom stock may also be difficult to determine where a company's overall worth is disputed.
See, for example, Foltz, 865 F2d at 367.
" Teitelbaum, J Am Society CLU & ChFC at 47 (cited in note 1).
43 Id.
' See, for example, Spitz v Berlin Industries, Inc., 1994 US Dist LEXIS 1576, *1-2 (N
D Ill) (describing a phantom stockholder agreement that was amended when employees
complained about its lack of flexibility). See also Teitelbaum, J Am Society CLU & ChFC
1995] 1283
The University of Chicago Law Review
phantom stock plans address this problem, however, by allowing
employees to choose the date of settlement.45
II. THE FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS
Directors must behave honorably toward those to whom they
owe fiduciary duties. As one judge has noted, however, "while
corporate directors do owe fiduciary duties, the duties are not
owed to the world at large."" This Section examines the differ-
ent obligations directors owe to common stockholders, creditors,
and phantom stockholders.
A. Duties Owed to Common Stockholders
A corporation's board of directors is responsible for managing
the business affairs of the corporation.47 Directors review and
approve significant investment and operational decisions, make
financial decisions (such as whether to issue new securities or
pay dividends), and appoint, monitor, and determine the compen-
sation of the firm's officers.4" In this capacity, directors owe two
specific duties to the corporation and its common shareholders:
the duties of care and loyalty.49
First, the duty of care requires directors to exercise the care
in their business affairs that a normally prudent person would
exercise under similar circumstances. 0 In order to comply with
this duty, directors must review any and all material information
before making a business decision.5 After reviewing all of the
at 47 (cited in note 1).
4' See note 18.
Ass'n of Haystack Property Owners, Inc. v Sprague, 494 A2d 122, 125 (Vt 1985).
Aronson v Lewis, 473 A2d 805, 811 (Del 1984), quoting 8 Del Code Ann § 141(a)
(1991) ("The business and affairs of a corporation... shall be managed by or under the
direction of a board of directors .... ").
4' See William A. Klein and John C. Coffee, Jr., Business Organization and Finance:
Legal and Economic Principles 126-27 (Foundation, 5th ed 1993).
" Dennis J. Block, Nancy E. Barton, and Stephen A. Radin, The Business Judgment
Rule: Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Directors 1 (Prentice Hall, 3d ed 1989). See also
Aronson, 473 A2d at 811 (stating that directors owe certain fiduciary obligations to a
corporation and its shareholders).
' See Norlin Corp. v Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F2d 255, 264 (2d Cir 1984). See also
Committee on Corporate Laws, Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law of the
American Bar Association, Corporate Director's Guidebook, 33 Bus Law 1591, 1600 (1978)
("[T]he corporate director [ I assumes a duty to act carefully in fulfilling the important
tasks of monitoring and directing the activities of corporate management.").
51 See, for example, Smith v Van Gorkom, 488 A2d 858, 874 (Del 1985) (holding that
directors breached their duty of care by hurriedly approving a merger without reading all
of the relevant documents or considering alternatives).
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relevant information, the directors must act with "requisite care
in the discharge of their duties."52 So long as directors perform
these duties with reasonable prudence and do not breach their
other fiduciary duties, they are free from liability.
Second, the duty of loyalty proscribes faithlessness and self-
dealing by corporate directors and officers.53 When a director ac-
cepts his position, he "commits allegiance to the enterprise and
acknowledges that the best interests of the corporation and its
shareholders must prevail over any individual interest of his
own."
54
Finally, courts apply the business judgment rule to deter-
mine whether directors have breached these fiduciary duties. 5
This rule essentially directs courts to refrain from examining the
business decisions nonconflicted directors or officers make.56
Consequently, the rule almost completely insulates directors from
liability for actions taken while managing the corporation.
B. Duties Owed to Creditors
Corporate directors generally do not owe fiduciary duties to
creditors or debt holders." Creditors have no existing property
right or equitable interest to support these duties.5" The normal
relationship between a corporation and its creditors is contractu-
al rather than fiduciary in nature, and therefore, principles of
contract law govern.59 Although modern contract law recognizes
an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in all con-
52 Aronson, 473 A2d at 812.
Norlin, 744 F2d at 264.
Committee on Corporate Laws, 33 Bus Law at 1599 (cited in note 50).
Aronson, 473 A2d at 812. See also Block, Barton, and Radin, The Business Judg-
ment Rule at 2-3 (cited in note 49).
56 Klein and Coffee, Business Organization and Finance at 150 (cited in note 48). The
business judgment rule applies where directors are: (1) making a business decision; (2)
disinterested; (3) exercising due care; (4) acting in good faith; and (5) not abusing discre-
tion or promoting waste. Block, Barton, and Radin, The Business Judgment Rule at 2
(cited in note 49).
"7 See Simons v Cogan, 549 A2d 300, 304 (Del 1988) (holding that a corporation and
its directors have no fiduciary duty to holders of convertible debentures). See also Ass'n of
Haystack Property Owners, Inc. v Sprague, 145 Vt 443, 494 A2d 122, 125 (1985).
' See Simons, 549 A2d at 304 ("Before a fiduciary duty arises, an existing property
right or equitable interest supporting such a duty must exist.").
' See, for example, Katz v Oak Industries Inc., 508 A2d 873, 879 n 7 (Del Chanc
1986) (holding that a director's decision to restructure long-term debt breached neither an
express contractual duty nor the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing).
1995] 1285
1286 The University of Chicago Law Review [62:1275
tracts," this implied covenant does not rise to the level of a fi-
duciary duty.6 1
The relationship between corporate directors and creditors
changes, however, when a corporation becomes insolvent. In such
a situation, the directors' fiduciary duties shift from the stock-
holders to the creditors,62 and the creditors become the equitable
owners of the corporation.63 The directors and officers of an in-
solvent corporation are thus obligated to represent creditors in-
stead of stockholders." •
C. Duties Owed to Phantom Stockholders
No court has yet addressed whether corporate directors owe
fiduciary duties to phantom stockholders; however, some courts
have considered disputes involving phantom stock arrangements.
In general, courts have analyzed these disputes from a contract
perspective,65 and have thus treated phantom stockholders more
like creditors than common shareholders.66 Treating these
agreements as contracts makes some sense: phantom sharehold-
ers own no equity in the firm,67 delegate no authority to man-
agement, and do not enlist management to act as their substi-
tutes.68 Under such an analysis, phantom stockholders would
o Id at 880. See also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 (1979) (imposing "upon
each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in [the] performance and [] enforcement"
of contracts).
61 Compare the description of fiduciary duties in note 4.
See, for example, In re STN Enterprises, 779 F2d 901, 904 (2d Cir 1985) ("The
district court's ruling failed to take into account that, although in most states directors of
a solvent corporation do not owe a fiduciary duty to creditors, quite the reverse is true
when the corporation becomes insolvent."). See also Geyer v Ingersoll Publications Co., 621
A2d 784, 787 (Del Chanc 1992) (holding that fiduciary duties to creditors arise when in-
solvency exists in fact, not merely upon the initiation of bankruptcy proceedings).
63 See Comment, Geyer v. Ingersoll Publications Co.: Insolvency Shifts Directors'
Burden from Shareholders to Creditors, 19 Del J Corp L 177, 185 (1994). See also Steven
R. Gross, Deborah F. Stiles, and Charles E. Joseph, Shifting Duties: Directors Face Risks
in Workout, Natl L J 19, 19 (Apr 15, 1991).
6 See New York Credit Men's Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v Weiss, 305 NY 1, 110 NE2d
397, 398 (1953) (holding that upon insolvency, directors are considered trustees for the
benefit of the corporation's creditors).
' See, for example, Healy v Rich Products Corp., 981 F2d 68, 72 (2d Cir 1992) (inter-
preting the "no competition" clause of a phantom stockholder agreement as a contractual
term).
See, for example, Strzelecki v Schwarz Paper Co., 824 F Supp 821, 828 (N D Ill
1993) (holding that an employee alleging nonpayment under the phantom stock plan
stated valid contract claims).
6' See Teitelbaum, J Am Society CLU & ChFC at 46 (cited in note 1); text accompa-
nying note 31.
' Unlike common stockholders, phantom stockholders make no capital investment in
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enjoy only traditional contractual rights. On the other hand, one
can argue that phantom stockholders are much like minority
shareholders in close corporations, to whom the majority does
owe fiduciary duties: both groups often resemble partners, are
involved in the day-to-day operation of the company,69 have no
ready market for their shares, 7° and are susceptible to potential
abuses by the directors.
It is important to determine whether directors owe fiduciary
duties to phantom stockholders because, like common stockhold-
ers, phantom stockholders may suffer when directors fail to act
prudently in the management of the corporation-thus breaching
their duty of care-or when they seek to maximize their own
wealth at the expense of the corporation-a breach of their duty
of loyalty. Furthermore, phantom stockholders may face problems
associated with the valuation of the corporation and unfair trad-
ing by corporate insiders.
1. Duty of care violations.
The failure of directors to perform their duties with the care,
skill, and prudence of "like persons in a like position" may endan-
ger the interests of phantom stockholders.7' For example, as-
sume that MicroPerfect, Inc., a large, cash-rich computer con-
glomerate, offers to purchase HighTech Industries. HighTech's
board of directors hurriedly approves the sale without consider-
ing the possibility that there may be other proposals at higher
prices. Moreover, the board neglects to read the reports provided
by HighTech's officers and fails to seek expert advice. Because
the directors did not adequately inform themselves, they have
breached their duty of care. 72 But because Hannah is not a com-
mon shareholder-as she would be had she bargained for shares
of nonvoting common stock-she does not have standing to bring
a derivative action against the directors for this breach.73
the corporation and, therefore, do not delegate authority to management. See text accom-
panying note 32.
' See, for example, Spitz v Berlin Industries, Inc., 1994 US Dist Lexis 1576, *1 (N D
Ill); Healy v Rich Products Corp., 981 F2d 68, 69 (2d Cir 1992).
70 See note 34.
71 See Teitelbaum, J Am Society CLU & ChFC at 47 (cited in note 1); Norlin Corp. v
Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F2d 255, 264 (2d Cir 1984).
Compare Smith v Van Gorkom, 488 A2d 858, 874 (Del 1985).
7 See Klein and Coffee, Business Organization and Finance at 196-97 (cited in note
48); Clark, Corporate Law § 6.2.1 at 208 (cited in note 1). Compare Schilling v Belcher,
582 F2d 995, 996 (5th Cir 1978) ("[A] shareholder who sells his stock pending appeal of a
favorable judgment in a stockholder's derivative suit against the corporation, loses stand-
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2. Duty of loyalty violations.
Phantom stockholders also can be injured when directors
breach the duty of loyalty by placing their own interests before
those of the corporation. The most common duty of loyalty viola-
tion involves a self-dealing transaction, where a director causes
the corporation to purchase property from him at an inflated
price or to sell property to him at a bargain price.74 For exam-
ple, consider a situation in which Harry Harrison, a director of
HighTech, sells to the corporation a plot of land for a price far
above its market value. If Harrison cannot show that this self-
dealing transaction is inherently fair to HighTech, he will have
breached the duty of loyalty.75 Again, since Hannah is not a
common shareholder, she has no standing to bring a derivative
suit and is left unprotected against this behavior.
3. Valuation of the corporation.
Another source of potential harm to phantom stockholders
lies in the establishment of the corporation's value, the basis for
determining the value of the employee's phantom stock.76 The
danger is that officers and directors of the corporation may delib-
erately draw cash out of the company for the purpose of lowering
the value of the phantom stock.77 While this problem may right-
ly be considered another form of director self-dealing, it is worth
examining more specifically in this context because accurate
valuation of the corporation is vital to protecting the interests of
phantom stockholders.
Assume, for example, that Hannah has worked at HighTech
Industries for nearly ten years and that almost all of the one
thousand shares with which she was originally credited in the
phantom stock agreement have vested. Realizing that the compa-
ny will owe a substantial amount of cash to Hannah when she
settles her phantom stock account, the Harrison family, as the
board of directors of HighTech, decides to draw out large
ing to further prosecute or defend the case.. .
" Duty of loyalty violations may also occur in situations where directors usurp busi-
ness opportunities from the corporation, compete unfairly with it, or improperly resist a
corporate takeover in order to maintain their own control. See Klein and Coffee, Business
Organization and Finance at 166-69 (cited in note 48).
7" Id at 163-64.
6 See Teitelbaum, J Am Society CLU & ChFC at 47 (cited in note 1). See also text
accompanying notes 20-23.
77 See Teitelbaum, J Am Society CLU & ChFC at 47 (cited in note 1).
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amounts of cash from the business as salary, thereby reducing
the value of the corporation. By this self-dealing the Harrisons
have breached the fiduciary duty of loyalty. Their actions injure
Hannah because the value of her phantom stock account is based
on the (now deflated) value of HighTech Industries and, without
fiduciary protections, she has no standing to sue.
4. Unfair trading by corporate insiders.
Insider trading by corporate directors also can injure phan-
tom stockholders. Assume again that Hannah has been employed
at HighTech for a number of years, so that nearly all of her origi-
nally credited phantom shares have vested, but that she is now
contemplating leaving the company for other career opportuni-
ties. Just as Hannah is considering cashing out her phantom
stock account and departing for greener pastures, MicroPerfect
approaches Harry Harrison and offers to purchase HighTech In-
dustries for a price significantly in excess of HighTech's present
value. Harry talks to his family (the common shareholders), and
they decide to sell HighTech to MicroPerfect in order to take
advantage of the opportunity that has suddenly become available.
Because Hannah, as a phantom stockholder, is in the position of
a mere debt holder, Harry is not required to disclose to her the
inside information about the impending purchase."8 As a result,
Hannah is likely to settle her account before the purchase occurs
and miss out on the substantial profits she would have gained
had she retained her phantom stock.
III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CORPORATE DIRECTORS AND
PHANTOM STOCKHOLDERS
The previous Sections examined the characteristics of phan-
tom stock and the fiduciary duties of corporate directors, and
raised the question of whether directors should owe fiduciary
duties to phantom stockholders. This Section answers that ques-
" See Clark, Corporate Law § 6.2.1 at 208-09 (cited in note 1) (insider trading rules
do not apply to phantom stock plans). But see Jordan v Duff and Phelps, Inc., 815 F2d
429 (7th Cir 1987), where a divided panel held that under Securities Exchange Act Rule
10b-5, a corporation contemplating a lucrative merger had a duty to volunteer information
about the merger to a stockholder-employee who was considering quitting his job and
selling his stock back to the company, as required by the stockholder agreement. Judge
Easterbrook's discussion of this duty, however, is premised on the fact that the employee
was a holder of common stock and was owed other fiduciary duties. See id at 435. It is
unlikely that corporate directors would be required to disclose an impending merger to
debt holders or creditors.
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tion in the negative, concluding that, in order to protect the bar-
gained-for contracts between phantom stockholders and corpora-
tions, courts should refuse to recognize a fiduciary duty running
from directors to holders of phantom stock.
A. Contract Law versus Corporate Law
Contract law, and its implied contractual duties of good faith
and fair dealing, should determine the protections phantom
stockholders receive from the actions of corporate directors. If
phantom stock does not carry fiduciary duties, employees possess
greater freedom to select compensation programs that fit their
particular needs and desires. Employees can choose either to
receive the benefits of fiduciary protections by bargaining for
nonvoting common stock, or to forego those benefits by seeking a
phantom stock arrangement. It makes little sense, therefore, to
argue that fiduciary duties should trump actual, bargained-for
phantom stockholder agreements. Extending fiduciary duties to
holders of phantom stock would serve only to eliminate the dis-
tinction between nonvoting stock and phantom stock, thereby
depriving the parties of a contracting option. Since the fiduciary
duties of corporate law serve to complete imperfect bargains in a
contractual setting,79 corporate directors should not owe fiduci-
ary duties to phantom stockholders."
Suppose, for example, that Hannah is negotiating an employ-
ment contract with HighTech Industries. HighTech proposes to
include in her total compensation package an incentive-based,
deferred compensation plan. Two possible plans are contemplat-
ed: a phantom stock arrangement and a nonvoting common stock
arrangement. Hannah wants a plan that will give her ownership
of HighTech nonvoting stock and place her in a fiduciary rela-
tionship with HighTech's directors. She believes that a nonvoting
common stock arrangement is less risky than a phantom stock
plan. The directors, however, want to avoid assuming fiduciary
duties toward Hannah. In the final contract between the parties,
Hannah accepts a phantom stock arrangement and, in consider-
ation, is credited with fifty more shares of HighTech phantom
stock than she was initially offered. Consequently, the riskiness
"' See Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of
Corporate Law 92-93 (Harvard, 1991).
' Compare William W. Bratton, Jr., The Economics and Jurisprudence of Convertible
Bonds, 1984 Wis L Rev 667, 730-39 (arguing that corporate directors should not owe fidu-
ciary duties to bondholders).
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of the phantom stockholder agreement-and the cost of the fidu-
ciary duties-is reflected in the "price" of the phantom shares
and in the structure of the resulting agreement.
In such a situation, the contractual terms of the phantom
stockholder agreement, rather than fiduciary principles, should
control. First, both employers and employees will benefit. Em-
ployers will be able to extend phantom stock to employees with-
out taking on additional fiduciary duties, and employees will
have the option of either bargaining for fiduciary protections or
receiving extra compensation for accepting phantom stock with-
out such protections. Where directors have engaged in self-deal-
ing to undervalue the corporation or traded unfairly on inside
information, the extra compensation employees receive for ac-
cepting phantom stock reflects, in some measure, the ex ante
probability that such director misbehavior might actually occur.
Injured employees are thus compensated for the risk.
Second, respecting the terms of the bargained-for agreement
promotes efficiency. When left to bargain freely, parties with full
information about the choice between fiduciary-governed nonvot-
ing stock and contract-governed phantom stock can efficiently
determine the value of fiduciary protections. Highly sought after
employees (either for recruitment or retention) are likely to be
sophisticated bargainers with adequate information, as compa-
nies will compete for their services by offering various employ-
ment alternatives. If the option to bargain for fiduciary-free
phantom stock is removed, these parties will not necessarily
adopt only fiduciary-governed deferred compensation plans: they
are more likely to explore other, less desirable options as well.
For example, it is not clear that if HighTech Industries was pre-
cluded from offering Hannah fiduciary-free phantom stock the
company would offer her nonvoting common stock with fiduciary
protections. In order to avoid such obligations toward Hannah,
HighTech might instead pursue less efficient options, such as
increasing her salary or failing to retain her. Increasing
Hannah's salary may be less efficient (or impossible) if HighTech
is trying to reserve capital for other purposes. Similarly, failing
to retain Hannah-a real possibility if HighTech cannot issue her
fiduciary-free phantom stock or is unable to raise her salary-is
less efficient because HighTech will presumably be forced to hire
and train a replacement.
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It is true that fiduciary duties can sometimes be an efficient
substitute for costly contracts." Some commentators have ar-
gued that corporate law is efficient if it provides standard, im-
plied contract terms that give creditors the sort of protections
against default for which they normally would contract. Thus,
if Hannah and HighTech negotiated the terms of her phantom
stockholder agreement absent a background of fiduciary law, the
parties would have to include specific terms about the duty of
care HighTech's directors would assume toward Hannah, the
directors' willingness to avoid self-dealing, and so forth. Such
negotiations, it is argued, are less efficient than the imposition of
corporate fiduciary duties.
Extending fiduciary duty law to the relationship between
corporate directors and phantom stockholders, however, would be
more costly and less efficient than simply allowing the parties to
bargain for fiduciary duties according to the type of compensation
plan they choose. With this freedom, for example, Hannah need
not inefficiently bargain for each and every fiduciary protection
and translate them to contract terms. Instead, she can simply
bargain for nonvoting common stock if she wants fiduciary
protections, or for phantom stock if she does not.8" The
flexibility to exercise such contracting options will ultimately be
limited if phantom stockholders are allowed to receive the protec-
tion of fiduciary duties for which they have not bargained; cor-
porations will simply decline to "issue" such costly phantom
stock.
Third, in a contract setting, parties dealing at arm's length
can bargain hard and enforce their deals to the letter, no matter
how severe the consequences to the other side." With phantom
stock agreements in particular, there is little reason to fear that
employees entering into such arrangements are less sophisticated
or have less bargaining power than employers. By definition, a
"key" employee to whom phantom stock has been offered is bar-
gaining from a position of strength-the employer needs the
See Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 Vand L Rev 1259,
1264 (1982).
' See Easterbrook and Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law at 34 (cited
in note 79). See also Richard A. Posner, The Rights of Creditors of Affiliated Corporations,
43 U Chi L Rev 499, 506-09 (1976).
' Theoretically, if phantom stock is not accompanied by director fiduciary duties it
will be less expensive than nonvoting equity stock.
' Easterbrook and Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law at 90 (cited in
note 79).
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employee and is trying to recruit or retain him. Consequently,
the employee may request nonvoting common stock, bargain for
fiduciary-like protections in the phantom stockholder agreement,
or negotiate for additional consideration in exchange for assum-
ing the risks associated with phantom stock.
Fourth, corporations enter into contracts with many parties,
including suppliers, workers, and bondholders. Because contracts
with these parties can be written in detail, the rights of these
parties vis-h-vis the corporation can be specified and there is no
need for fiduciary duties." Both workers (through employment
contracts) and bondholders (through bondholder agreements) are
protected by the terms of their contracts, rather than by fiduciary
duties.86 Similarly, where workers are also phantom stockhold-
ers, both their rights in employment and their "investment"
rights under the phantom stockholder agreement can be written
specifically enough to eliminate the need for fiduciary duties.
Phantom stockholders, like bondholders, can be protected against
duty of care and duty of loyalty violations by the specific terms of
the phantom stockholder agreements. Moreover, as with bonds,
the risk that directors will abuse their power and harm phantom
stockholders will be reflected in the stock's "price," a term of the
phantom stock contract.
As previously discussed, the similarities between phantom
stock and nonvoting common stock support the conclusion that
the bargain of the parties should govern." It is precisely be-
cause they are so similar that courts should respect the decision
by employers and employees specifically to enter into either
phantom stockholder or nonvoting common stockholder agree-
ments. Employees desiring fiduciary protection can negotiate for
nonvoting common stock, while employers attempting to avoid
fiduciary responsibilities can choose to offer only phantom stock.
Thus, the similarity of these two deferred compensation options
strengthens the argument that the option ultimately selected, in
its originally bargained-for form, should control the relationship
of the parties.
Finally, there are some situations where parties may not
bargain around fiduciary duties. The Employee Retirement In-
Id at 90-91.
See, for example, Broad v Rockwell Intl. Corp., 642 F2d 929, 955-60 (5th Cir 1981)
(en banc) (stating that managers' fiduciary duties to bondholders need not be analyzed
where those obligations are exceeded by contractual duties).
' See text accompanying notes 26-29.
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come Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), for example, prohibits par-
ties from such bargaining in the context of retirement income."
The legislative history of ERISA, however, suggests that Con-
gress did not intend for this prohibition to extend to phantom
stock. 9 Congress's decision not to extend the prohibition again
supports the argument that the bargained-for terms of the phan-
tom stockholder agreement should be preferred over fiduciary
rules.
B. Problems with Extending Fiduciary Duties to Phantom
Stockholders
There are several problems with extending fiduciary duties
to phantom stockholders, rather than respecting their bargained-
for contracts. First, phantom stockholders will be overprotected if
the terms of the phantom stockholder agreement do not control.
Second, officers and directors will be hindered in their efforts to
effectively manage the corporation because they will owe fiducia-
ry duties to two different and sometimes conflicting constituen-
cies.
1. Overprotection of phantom stockholders.
Corporate fiduciary law is undesirable in the context of
phantom stock plans because fiduciary principles will necessarily
override express contractual provisions in the phantom stockhold-
er agreements and create the risk of overprotecting phantom
stockholders." Overprotection is costly, and corporations (and
See 29 USC § 1104 (1988 & Supp 1993).
One court has held that ERISA may govern some phantom stock arrangements.
See note 17. It appears, however, that Congress did not intend for the fiduciary require-
ments of ERISA to extend to phantom stock plans. The Conference Report in the legisla-
tive history of ERISA states:
[Tihe labor fiduciary rules do not apply to [a] ... plan primarily devoted to providing
deferred compensation for a select group of management or highly compensated em-
ployees. For example, if a "phantom stock" or "shadow stock" plan were to be estab-
lished solely for the officers of a corporation, it would not be covered by the' labor
fiduciary rules.
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Conference Report, HR Rep No 93-
1280, 93d Cong, 2d Sess 296 (1974). In passing ERISA, Congress may have declined to
extend the fiduciary duties of corporate directors to phantom stockholders under the as-
sumption that most phantom stockholders would be either officers or directors. In such a
situation, requiring corporate officers and directors to owe fiduciary duties to themselves
as phantom stockholders would be superfluous. But even if lower-level employees were
granted phantom stock, placing them in a fiduciary relationship with directors would be
imprudent for the reasons outlined in this Section.
' Compare Bratton, 1984 Wis L Rev at 739 (cited in note 80) (arguing that extending
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consequently their shareholders) will be the parties who bear this
cost.
Assume that Hannah agrees to receive in her compensation
package phantom stock, rather than nonvoting common stock,
after HighTech offers her a greater number of phantom shares as
consideration for accepting a fiduciary-free arrangement. If, in a
later judicial proceeding, fiduciary duties toward Hannah are
imposed on HighTech's directors, Hannah will have been overpro-
tected. In essence, she will have received more than she bar-
gained for-both a greater number of phantom shares and the
fiduciary protections that typically accompany common stock.
HighTech, on the other hand, will be forced to bear the costs of
both the bargain (granting the extra shares to Hannah) and the
judicial imposition of fiduciary duties.9' Such a result is far less
satisfactory than that which would be reached by simply allowing
the parties to bargain for fiduciary protections.
2. Corporate governance problems.
Another potential problem with extending fiduciary duties to
phantom stockholders is that directors cannot fully serve both
equity and phantom stockholders simultaneously. Management
would be subject to conflicting obligations if it had a duty both to
maximize stockholder returns and to protect the interests of
phantom stockholders.92
For example, assume that Hannah's phantom stockholder
agreement with HighTech Industries is structured so that it does
not pay her the equivalent of the dividends paid on the under-
lying stock. The Harrisons, as directors, vote to pay out large
dividends to the shareholders, themselves. This action decreases
the value of HighTech at the expense of Hannah, whose phantom
stock account is valued in direct relation to the value of the com-
pany.
In this situation, HighTech's directors face a dilemma if they
owe fiduciary duties both to HighTech's common stockholders and
fiduciary duties to bondholders will result in overprotection of them).
" The uncertainty of the law as to whether directors owe phantom stockholders
fiduciary duties, coupled with the fact that no jurisdictions has yet addressed this issue,
strongly indicates that such overprotection would not be a one-time problem, but would
recur repeatedly from one jurisdiction to the next.
' Compare John C. Coffee, Jr., and Donald E. Schwartz, The Survival of the Deriva-
tive Suit: An Evaluation and a Proposal for Legislative Reform, 81 Colum L Rev 261, 313
(1981) ('fT]he interests of equity holders and those of creditors frequently conflict, and the
board cannot serve both equally in making determinations about business risks.").
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to Hannah, a phantom stockholder. Because they owe a duty to
Hannah to protect the value of her phantom stock account and to
the common shareholders to pay out dividends, the business
judgment rule would not insulate the directors from liability for
their determination of dividend payments. Instead, the directors
would have to show that every dividend decision (and possibly
every corporate decision) they made was appropriate. Such a
result is substantially less efficient than a finding that the direc-
tors do not owe fiduciary duties to phantom stockholders, as the
business judgment rule operates to promote efficiency by allowing
directors to make business decisions freely.
To protect herself from such a situation, Hannah could bar-
gain for assurances that the payment of dividends would be rea-
sonable. Alternatively, she could bargain for more shares of
phantom stock in return for assuming the risk that directors
might attempt to reduce the value of the company by paying out
excessive dividends.
Admittedly, corporate directors already must resolve conflicts
between security holders. The clash of interests between pre-
ferred and common stockholders, for example, can be similar to
the conflict between equity and phantom stockholders. 3 Despite
the conflict, directors owe a fiduciary duty to both classes of
stockholders.94 But just as the allocation of dividends between
preferred stockholders and common stockholders is controlled by
the contractual provisions of the individual stockholder agree-
ments, so too should the contract provisions in the phantom
stockholder agreement prevail where phantom stock is con-
cerned."
C. Phantom Stockholders versus Common Stockholders
Although some commentators have noted that common stock-
holders are no more the owners of a company than are creditors
or employees," it is certain that courts do not consider phantom
stockholders to be a corporation's owners.97 Unlike common
Compare Ronald J. Gilson, The Case Against Shark Repellent Amendments: Struc-
tural Limitations on the Enabling Concept, 34 Stan L Rev 775, 834-36 n 229 (1982)
(asserting that in some situations the conflict between two classes of stock is the same as
the conflict between common stockholders and bondholders).
See note 28.
95 See Section III.A.
Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J L &
Econ 395, 396 (1983). See also Easterbrook and Fischel, The Economic Structure of
Corporate Law at 24-25 (cited in note 79).
' Teitelbaum, J Am Society CLU & ChFC at 46 (cited in note 1) ("[P]hantom stock
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stockholders, phantom stockholders neither invest capital in the
corporation8 nor delegate authority to the directors.9 Conse-
quently, phantom stockholders have no ownership interest in the
corporation.
Proponents of extending director fiduciary duties to phantom
stockholders contend that phantom stockholders are like minority
shareholders in close corporations.0 0 There is often very little
difference, in close corporations, between the relationship of the
directors to phantom stockholders and the relationship of the
directors to common stockholders. Furthermore, majority share-
holders in close corporations owe a high standard of fiduciary
duty to minority shareholders.'0 ' Thus, proponents of extending
fiduciary duties to phantom stockholders may argue that since
phantom stockholders (in corporations generally) are like minori-
ty shareholders in close corporations, phantom stockholders
should receive fiduciary protections.
Phantom stockholders do resemble minority shareholders in
close corporations in several respects. For example, phantom
stockholders often participate in the operation of the corpora-
tion,"' and they have no ready market for their shares. 1"3
plans are ideal for businesses that wish to provide compensation to employees without
relinquishing equity interests."); Hutchings, J Am Society CLU at 34 (cited in note 1).
" Advocates of extending fiduciary duties to phantom stockholders may argue that
employees who accept phantom stock as a part of their total compensation effectively
"invest" in the firm. For example, assume Hannah is offered a one-year contract at
MicroPerfect with a salary of $100,000. In response, HighTech offers her a one-year con-
tract with a salary of $90,000 plus $10,000 worth of phantom stock, which Hannah
accepts. One might argue that by foregoing the extra $10,000 in salary and instead
accepting $10,000 worth of HighTech phantom stock, Hannah has invested in the firm.
However, since Hannah did not bargain for fiduciary duties, her "investment" is more like
the investment of a bondholder (to whom no fiduciary duties are owed) than that of a
common stockholder.
See note 68.
'o One court has defined close corporations as having a small number of shareholders,
significant shareholder participation in the operation of the corporation, and no ready
market for shares. Donahue v Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., 367 Mass 578,
328 NE2d 505, 511 (1975).
101 See id at 515 (holding that "strict" fiduciary duties exist for all close corporation
shareholders because of the similarity between close corporations and partnerships). See
also Crosby v Beam, 47 Ohio St 3d 105, 548 NE2d 217, 221 (1989) (holding that majority
or controlling shareholders in a close corporation have a heightened fiduciary duty to mi-
nority shareholders).
'o' Phantom stockholders, because they are typically highly-valued, key employees,
often participate in the operation of the business. See, for example, Spitz v Berlin Indus-
tries, Inc., 1994 US Dist LEXIS 1576, *1 (N D Ill). See also Healy v Rich Products Corp.,
981 F2d 68, 69 (2d Cir 1992).
Minority stockholders in close corporations often engage in similar behavior. Unlike
most stockholders in public corporations, who are simply seeking a return on their invest-
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Moreover, advocates would argue, phantom stockholders are
susceptible to the same dangers that inherently affect minority share-
holders in close corporations.'"
The similarities between phantom stockholders and minority
shareholders in close corporations, however, are not strong
enough to overcome the fact that phantom stockholders neither
invest in corporations nor delegate authority to directors in the
same way that common shareholders do. Furthermore, courts
should be little concerned for the welfare of phantom stockhold-
ers. First, phantom stockholders in large, publicly held corpora-
tions are for the most part protected from director abuse by the
fiduciary duties running from the directors to the common share-
holders. Because the shares of the common stockholders underlie
the phantom shares, 5 there is little danger of director abuse.
If directors fulfill their fiduciary duties to the common share-
holders and maximize the value of the corporation, the phantom
shareholders will be protected. More importantly, however, em-
ployees offered phantom stock have the option of bargaining in-
stead for nonvoting common stock, virtually identical to phantom
stock except that it carries fiduciary protections.
Second, even in close corporations there is insufficient reason
to be concerned with the possibility that directors might take
advantage of phantom stockholders." 6 As with phantom stock-
holders in large corporations, employees are still free to bargain
for nonvoting common stock with fiduciary protections, instead of
accepting phantom stock without such protections.
ment and often have only a passive interest in the day-to-day operation of the business,
stockholders in close corporetions typically take an active role in the operation of the
company. See F.H. O'Neal and R. Thompson, 1 O'Neal's Oppression of Minority Share-
holders § 3:06 at 37 (Clark Boardman Callaghan, 2d ed 1994).
103 Phantom stock is typically illiquid. In fact, many phantom stock agreements
stipulate that the phantom stock granted to the employee is inalienable. See text accom-
panying note 34.
Stock in close corporations is usually unmarketable as well. While a disgruntled
minority shareholder in a publicly held corporation can easily sell his stock, it is just the
reverse for minority shareholders in a close corporation. See O'Neal and Thompson, 1
O'Neal's Oppression of Minority Shareholders § 3:06 at 37.
104 Minority shareholders in close corporations, for example, may be especially suscep-
tible to problems associated with valuation of the corporation and insider trading. See
text accompanying notes 76-78.
105 See text accompanying notes 20-23.
106 This remains true even though in the typical close corporation there are few
common shareholders, the common shareholders are usually also corporate insiders, and,
consequently, employees receiving phantom stock may be more susceptible to harm.
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Moreover, phantom stockholders are more similar to credi-
tors than they are to minority shareholders in close corporations.
Because phantom stock is a contractual right to "a deferred cash
bonus," phantom stockholders are essentially creditors."7 In all
corporations, common stockholders receive fiduciary protections
because, as owners, they delegate responsibility for the manage-
ment of the corporation to the directors. In return, directors
promise, through fiduciary duties, to work hard and honestly.
10 8
In contrast, the considerations of trust, agency, and delegation of
power that underlie duties to stockholders are not involved where
creditors are concerned. Since phantom stockholders are like
creditors, phantom stock should not carry with it the rights en-
joyed by common shareholders, such as the rights to vote, in-
spect, and sue derivatively ° 9-nor should directors owe phan-
tom stockholders fiduciary duties.
CONCLUSION
Courts should refuse to recognize fiduciary duties running
from corporate directors to holders of phantom stock. Contract
law should prevail over corporate fiduciary law in the context of
phantom stockholder agreements because employees in this situ-
ation typically have both equal bargaining power and the oppor-
tunity to negotiate for fiduciary duties by bargaining for nonvot-
ing common stock. Conversely, if fiduciary duties were extended
to phantom stockholders, overprotection of phantom stockholders
and problems of corporate governance would likely result. Final-
ly, phantom stockholders are not sufficiently similar to minority
shareholders in close corporations to merit the same fiduciary
treatment or to enjoy the security that accompanies fiduciary
relationships.
' See Clark, Corporate Law § 6.2.1 at 208 (cited in note 1).
"o Easterbrook and Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law at 91 (cited in
note 79).
", See Clark, Corporate Law § 6.2.1 at 208 (cited in note 1).
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